Security

This service can spend money. These are the boundaries it keeps and the ones you have to keep.

What the service enforces

  • Token on everything. The API and MCP refuse to start without a token of at least 32 characters, and compare it in constant time. Only /healthz and /ready are open.
  • Unrestricted node RPC stays inside the container. monerod’s full RPC (port 18081), which can stop the daemon, roll back the chain, and ban peers, binds 127.0.0.1 inside the container. Only the restricted RPC (18089) and P2P (18080) bind every interface.
  • Optional node RPC login. Set DOCKER_MONERO_RPC_LOGIN=username:password to require HTTP digest authentication on both RPC listeners. Remote wallets connect to 18089 with this username and password. The service authenticates its own node calls and wallet processes automatically. Empty leaves RPC login disabled. The login reaches monerod through its child environment and wallet processes through temporary files with mode 0600 in a 0700 directory under /tmp, deleted once their RPC answers. It never reaches a command line or log.
  • Wallet processes stay inside the container. Each monero-wallet-rpc binds a loopback port with its login disabled. The container’s loopback is shared only by this service and its own child processes.
  • Wallet passwords never reach a command line. Passwords go to the wallet process over its loopback RPC, so they do not show up in /proc or ps. They are never logged.
  • Sends wait for sync. A transfer is refused until the node is synchronized and the wallet has caught up with it.
  • Write switches. DOCKER_MONERO_READ_ONLY refuses every write, DOCKER_MONERO_ALLOW_TRANSFERS=false refuses sends, and MCP agents cannot send unless DOCKER_MONERO_MCP_ALLOW_TRANSFERS=true. See configuration.md.
  • No secrets in error responses. Errors carry a fixed code and message; internal error text stays in the log.
  • Hardened image. Non-root UID 10001, works with a read-only root filesystem and every capability dropped. The Monero release tarballs are checked against SHA-256 hashes pinned in the Dockerfile from the signed hashes.txt.

What you have to do

  • Do not publish 8080 to the internet. Bind it to loopback and put a reverse proxy with TLS in front, or reach it over a tailnet. The token travels in a header, so plain HTTP across a network exposes it.
  • Back up the host data directory’s wallets subdirectory (./data/wallets with the default DOCKER_MONERO_DATA_PATH). The .keys files are your wallets. Each is encrypted with its password; a lost password cannot be recovered. Keep the seeds offline too.
  • Pick strong wallet passwords. Anyone with the token and a wallet’s password can open and spend it.
  • Run read-only when you can. Once the wallets you need exist, a watching deployment does not need writes.
  • Treat the token like a private key. Anyone holding it can open wallets whose passwords they know, create wallets, and send from open wallets unless transfers are disabled.